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Abstract：Internet and computers are now a part
of our daily routine life. With the development of
network and information technology, E-mail has
became increasingly popular and the society’s
indispensable need. However, virus spreading via
the E-mail is also increasing at an enormous rate.
The E-mail attachment such as PDF Document,
Microsoft Word Document, EXE program can
spread viruses from one computer to another
computer. This paper describes and analyses the
various forms of the E-mail viruses via the
Microsoft Word Documents and the PDF
Documents. We describe the methodology to detect
such E-mail viruses using tools such as
OfficeMalscanner for Word Documents and PDF
stream Dumper for PDF Documents.
1. Introduction
With the extensive use of computers, more and
more people use E-mail for communication and
hence paving the way for the spreading of virus
through e-mail. There are various types of malware
such as Worms, Trojans and malicious code. These
viruses have a strong impact on the system, like,
destroying data on the disk, make the computer or
network running slowly, destroying the video
display screen[1]. An E-mail virus is a destructive
computer program and is embedded in the text by
malicious code or attachments and then exploiting
people’s curiosity to open e-mail. An example of
the E-mail virus is “I love you”. This virus makes
people to open the attachment with “I love you” as
the subject, and then the receiver computer will be
infected by the malicious code. Once the computer
has been infected, this virus will forward the E-mail
with the virus to the receiver’s address list. Another
example is the “Melissa” virus in 1999. The virus
sent the virus document as an e-mail message to
top 50 people in the receiver’s address book. This
virus contains the friendly message and the
sender’s name. It also infects all the Word
documents that are opened subsequently on the
receiver’s machine [3].
A variety of viruses can be spread through the E-
mail attachment. It contains a piece of code in an
attachment document, for example, PDF
documents, Microsoft Word documents and .EXE
programs. This paper begins with a description and
extends to the analysis of viruses in the attachments
of the E-mail[2]. Section 2 describes structure of
the Microsoft Word Document and its
vulnerabilities. Section 3 describes PDF Document
structure. Section 4 describes methodology to
detect viruses affected Microsoft Word and PDF
Documents. This Section also explores various
tools available for detection of such infected files.
2. Microsoft Word Document
Microsoft Word is a word processor developed by
Microsoft and can be used to type letters, reports,
and other documents. It facilitates desktop
publishing. The vulnerability in word document file
is the presence of Macros. Generally, Macros are
used for creating shortcuts to tasks performing
repeatedly. Attackers make use of this feature and
infect the Macros present in a document. When a
word processing or spreadsheet document
containing infected virus is opened, the Macro
virus gets activated and infects the Normal template
(Normal.dot)-a general purpose file that stores
default document formatting settings. Every
document opened with Word Processor refers to the
Normal template, and hence gets infected with the
Macro virus. Since this virus attaches itself to
documents, the infection can spread if such
documents are opened on other computers. These
documents spread through mails by attackers [4].
In the past five years, Macro malware could be
considered practically extinct. A resurgence of
malicious VBA Macros has been observed – this
time, not only self-replicating viruses, but simple
downloader Trojan codes [3].
Macro viruses can use the
VBA SHELL command or utilize the operating
system's kernel API to run any external command
they want. The VBA KILL command can be used
to delete files. Macro viruses modify registries, use
E-mail to forward copies of itself to others, look for
passwords, copy documents, and infect other
programs. Macro viruses can do a lot of different
damage in a lot of different ways [3].
2.1 Vulnerability in the MS-WORD in the form
of Macro code:
The macro code, designed for automatic execution
on opening of a Word Document, has the following
structure (the order in which the individual
functions appear and the name of the main function
varies in the different variants):
Sub Auto_Open()
main_code()
International Journal of Science Engineering and AdvanceTechnology,IJSEAT, Vol 3, Issue 3,March - 2015 ISSN 2321-6905
www.ijseat.com Page 62
End Sub
Sub main_code()
...End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
Auto_Open
End Sub
The main code is either in or called from the
Auto_Open() function which is invoked when a
Word document is opened or Word is started. If the
code in the subroutine main_code() is corrupted
with virus code, automatically corrupts all the files
that are opened with the Word Processor. Similarly
Workbook_Open (which is invoked when
an Excel workbook is opened) and other
automacros Auto_Close (Runs each time you close
document), Auto_Exec (Runs whenever you start
word) corrupts the files if their code is replaced
with the corrupted code [3].
Because a macro virus works using the application
rather than an operating system, it can also infect
non-Windows computers as well. Macro viruses
are also known as script viruses and can also be
embedded within web pages.
2.2 Tool to extract Macro code-
OfficeMalScanner:
OfficeMalScanner is a MS Office forensic tool to
scan for malicious traces, like shellcode heuristics,
PE-files or embedded OLE streams. This tool
developed by Frank Boldewin which is used for
extracting VB macro code from malicious office
documents(word,excel).
Usage: OfficeMalScanner <PPT, DOC or XLS
file> <scan | info> <brute> <debug>
Options:
scan - scans for shellcode heuristics and
encrypted PE-Files.
info - dumps OLE structures, offsets+length and
saves found VB-Macro code.
inflate - decompresses Ms Office 2007 documents,
e.g. docx, into a temp dir.
Switches: (only enabled if option "scan" was
selected)
brute - enables the "brute force mode" to find
encrypted stuff.
debug - prints out disassembly resp hexoutput if a
heuristic was found.
3.Portable Document Format
Portable Document Format (PDF) is a file format
that is used to represent the documents in a manner
independent of hardware, operating system and a
running application, with which it is possible to
create, view, print and exchange documents
reliably and environment independently. As a kind
of E-mail viruses, PDF malware is more and more
popular in the Internet. PDF files bearing malicious
content have been harming computer systems, and
in 2010 they have been considered one of the most
dangerous threats. It is possible to embedded
different types of files to attack computer, such as
JAVAScript code, ActionScript code or EXE files
[13 ].
3.1 PDF File Structure
To discover new vulnerabilities we need to
understand the PDF file format in detail. PDF has a
lot more functions than just text; it can include
images, bookmark objects and other multimedia
elements. It can be password protected and can
execute JavaScript, etc. The basic structure of a
PDF file is presented in the figure shown below:
Figure 3(a):Structure of PDF file
Figure 3(a) Table shows structure of pdf file
contents are explained below
 Header is the first line of a PDF file and specifies
the version number of the used PDF specification
which the document uses.
 Body contains text streams, images, and other
multimedia elements like fonts, bookmarks and
forms, etc. The Body section is used to hold the
entire document’s data being shown to the user.
 Cross Reference Table contains the references to
all the objects in the document and it allows
random access to objects in the file. Each object is
represented by one entry in the cross reference
table and is 20 bytes long.
Trailer contains the location of the cross
reference table in the file. Figure 3(b) describes
example code of PDF contents.
3.2 Example Malware embedded in PDF
A launch action launches an application or opens or
prints a document. One of the many Adobe Acrobat
exploits in the Metasploit framework to embed an
exe file in PDF as shown below.
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Figure 3(b):Example of PDF code
Figure 3(c):Launch function which opens
command prompt
Command Prompt will be automatically opened by
using the above launch action. Attackers can embed
the malware in our PDF by using JavaScript
because JavaScript commonly uses heap spray to
exploit.
3.3 Vulnerability in Portable Document Format
Adobe Acrobat is a family of application
software developed by Adobe Systems in order to
manage files in Portable Document Format. Adobe
has released Security Bulletin which describes
multiple vulnerabilities affecting Adobe Reader and
Acrobat 9.2x and earlier. An attacker could exploit
these vulnerabilities by convincing a user to open a
specially crafted PDF file. The Adobe Reader
browser plug-in that can automatically open PDF
documents hosted in a website is available for
multiple web browsers and operating systems.
These vulnerabilities allow a remote attacker to
execute malicious code, write unwanted files or
folders to the file system, and can cause a denial of
service or local privileges can be escalated on the
affected system as the result of a user opening a
malicious PDF document. They were 50
vulnerabilities discovered between 2008-2009 in
Adobe Reader [12 ].
3.4 MetaSploit
The Metasploit Project is an open source project
that provides a public resource for researching
security vulnerabilities and developing code that
allows a network administrator to break into his
own network to identify security risks and
document which vulnerabilities need to be
addressed first. Metasploit offers penetration
testing software and provides tools for automating
the comparison of a program's vulnerability and its
repaired (patched) version [13].
There are a couple of interfaces that can be used.
The first option is the MSFconsole which is the
hackers preferred method or most puritanical way
of using Metasploit. The other more approach
using Metasploit is to use Armitage.
3.4 PDF Analyzers:
There are various several tools available for
analyzing malicious pdf files. Didier Stevens
familiarize with pdfid, pdf-parser tools . Here in
this paper we analyze with PDF Stream Dumper,
PeePDF tools. PDF Stream Dumper is a tool
written by David Zimmer and Peepdf by Jose
Miguel Esparza that combines many open source
tools that are useful to analyze malicious PDF
documents. Obfuscated JavaScript, low level PDF
headers and objects, and shell code can be dealt
with this tools.
4. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In this section we describe the methodology for
detection of virus affected word and pdf files.
4.1 Detection of Macro Virus in word using
OfficeMalScanner
We propose methodology to extract macro code
from Malicious Word Document.
OfficeMalscanner tool is used to extract macro
code from a malicious word document.
1.Extract the file information of docx file using info
command. It dumps OLE structures, offsets and
length and saves found VB-Macro code.
2.Unpack the docx file using 7zip tool.
3.Use Inflate command to Decompress file.docx to
locate VB code (XML files).
4.Analyze the behaviour of VB Macro codes found
using Noriben tool.
4.2 Extracting VB Macro code from Microsoft
office file
We detect word document “Doc4.docx” file
whether it contains any macros.
Step 1: To get information of a file using info
option
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Figure 4(a):Opening file Doc4.docx
In Figure 4(a) we get information of file Doc4.docx
by using “info” option which describes file size and
type of file.
XML-formatted versions of Microsoft Office files,
which typically have extensions such as .docx,
.xlsx, and .pptx, are actually zip-compressed
archives that contain several files. You can unpack
the archive using tool 7zip.
Step2: Unpacking word Document (As word
2007 is XML formatted structure, it is placed in
zip archive)using7zip tool
Inside the ZIP file are predefined structures of files,
mostly XML files that describe the document and
it's content. So it can be easily read using standard
available libraries in scripting languages such as
Perl.
According to Microsoft a folder is created inside
the ZIP archive called "_rels". This folder contains
a file named ".rels" which defines the root
relationships within the package. This should be the
first place to be able to parse the content of the
document. Whithin the .res file you find tags that
define the relationship of the document:
<Relationship Id="someID"
Type="relationshipType" Target="targetPart"/>
Metadata is stored in files that contain a type of
"*properties", most notable the "core-properties"
and "extended-properties". These files are usually
stored in the following location:
 docProps/core.xml
 docProps/app.xml
These files then contain the actual metadata
information, such as document creator, last saved
by information, etc. To be able to display the
metadata information it is necessary to extract and
parse these documents.
Figure 4(b)XML formatted structure of word 2007.
Step 3: Viewing archive file in inflate mode.
When the archive file is viewed in Inflate mode,
word/vbaProject.bin is located as shown in the
Figure 4(c).  Generally VBA macros are stored in
binary OLE file within Zip archive, called
vbaProject.bin
Figure 4(c)VB-Macro code found inside file.
As in the Figure 4(c) word/vbaProject.bin is
located. Generally VBA macros are stored in
binary OLE file within Zip archive, called
vbaProject.bin
When we open “this.Document” specified at
address in Figure 4(c)
(C:\tools\OfficeMalScanner\VBAPROJECT.BIN-
Macros) contains Macro code.
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Macro code which is detected using
officeMalScanner tool in “Doc4.docx” consists of
Keylogger code as shown in In Figure 4(d). First
lines describes structure of  VBProject contains
attributes and properties.Marked text is a
Keylogger code.
Figure 4(d): keylogger code present in “This
Document”.
4.2.1 Noriben tool
As VB-Macro was found in word document,We
can analyze behaviour using Noriben tool. Noriben
is a Python-based script that works in conjunction
with Sysinternals Procmon to automatically collect,
analyze, and report on runtime indicators of
malware. In a nutshell, it allows to run malware,
hit a keypress, and get a simple text report of the
sample’s activities.We test for behaviour of macro
virus present in Doc4.docx with Noriben tool[15]
using the command “Noriben.py” working in
command prompt.
Figure 4(e): A CSV file created by Noriben
Noriben a behavioural malware analysis tool which
lists information of currently running processes in
system and their behaviour after they executed.
Figure 4(e) shows a CSV file created by Noriben
tool that contains processes created (a list of
present running processes) and File Activity
(information of background processes whenever a
particular process is being executed) .
Figure 4(f):File Activity Information
Figure 4(f) demonstrates that whenever a word
document is opened a text file is opened which logs
keys pressed by keyboard. Thus the infected virus
details for WORD documents can be observed.
4.3 Malicious PDF Analysis
Methodology followed to analyze malicious PDF
A).Create a malicious PDF file using one of the
exploits present in Metasploit Framework. Steps
followed for creating malicious PDF file is shown
below.
1)We find appropriate exploit by
searching in metasploit for one that will use  the
version of Adobe Reader using “Search” option.
2)We set payload for PDF file and then set
our IP Address to localhost using “LHOST” option.
3)Then generate malicious pdf file using
“exploit” option.
After successful generation of a malicious pdf file
in our localhost using metasploit framework we
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analyze this malicious file using tools such as
PDFStreamDumper , Peepdf tools
B).Next we analyze the file structure of malicious
PDF and explore its contents using PeePDF tool.
C)We identify the exploit using
PDFStreamDumper tool which includes a number
of signatures of known PDF exploits.
1)Load malicious PDF file in
PDFStreamDumper.
2)Next to scan the file select “Exploit
Scan” Which consists of known signatures of PDF
exploits. If our  generated malicious PDF file is
among the signatures it identifies exploit and
specifies where it is present.
We analyze the above steps in detail below.
A)Creating Malicious PDF file using metasploit.
Step 1:We search for appropriate PDF exploit by
Metasploit for one that will use the version of
Adobe Reader by using “search pdf_embedded”
option.
Figure 4(g) Adobe PDF exploits.
We can observe in the Figure 4(g) Metasploit listed
all exploits that meets our criteria.Weexploit
“exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded
_exe”.
Step 2:Creating a malicious file in local host.
First we need to set our payload to embed in pdf
file using ”set
payload/windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp”.After
setting payload Metasploit requires us to provide an
existing pdf file where it can embed a payload.Then
using LHOST option set to our IP Address.
Figure 4(h):Set LHOST to our IP Address.
We observe in Figure 4(h) we provide an existing
pdf file using “set FILENAME “notice.pdf” and we
set localhost to our IPAddress “set LHOST
192.168.0.100”
If all options are set then we need to do now exploit
using “exploit” option.
Step 3:Malicious pdf generated
Figure 4(i):Notice.pdf file is generated.
After successfull generation of malicious pdf file
which is stored on local computer
(C:/Users/.ms4/local/notice.pdf), the next step to
send malicious code to target email.Not only
sending malicious pdf file to victims but also can
be embedded to websites and inviting users to
download it.
B)Peepdf:
Peepdf, a new tool from Jose Miguel Esparza, is an
PDF analysis toolkit for examining and decoding
suspicious PDFs. it is a Python tool to explore PDF
files in order to find out if the file can be harmful or
not. The aim of this tool is to provide all the
necessary components that a security researcher
could need in a PDF analysis without using 3 or 4
tools to make all the tasks. With peepdf it's possible
to see all the objects in the document showing the
suspicious elements, supports all the most used
filters and encodings, it can parse different versions
of a file, object streams and encrypted files[16]. We
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analyze malicious file “notice.pdf” file with peepdf
tool. By using command peepdf.py –f notice.pdf
we analyze content and structure of “notice.pdf”
file.
Figure 4(j): Using Peepdf to get file information
Here in this Figure 4(j) we observe 5 objects in pdf
file. It displays suspicious elements in pdf file such
as /openAction and Launch functions. /Launch
function can launch an application. The number of
possible misuses of this Launch function is quite
infinite (running malicious code, steal data..).
/openAction whose elements are operating actions
whenever a file opened. Here suspicious code
present in object 5 as it represents Launch[5].
Figure 4(k): tree and offsets commands usage to
show logical and physical structure of pdf file.
Figure 4(l): Examine contents of object that
launches javascript.
Figure 4(l) includes malicious javascript code
which launches cmd and exe file(msf.exe).
C) PDF STREAM DUMPER
This tool also used to analyze malicious pdf files.It
has signature for exploits to compare against any
pdf file you want to examine.We analyze the
exploit which we created using metasploit i.e
“notice.pdf” file using pdf stream dumper tool.
After installing PDF Stream Dumper, load the
suspicious PDF file . The tool includes a number of
signatures of known PDF exploits. We can load
PDF file and select “exploit scan” on the top of
application interface then we find suspicious
objects within the PDFfile.
Figure 4(m):After exploit scan
In Figure 4(m) Malicious pdf file shows that it
contains exploit of CVE-2010-1240.This exploit is
vulnerability in Acobat Reader to extract and run  a
malicious executable embedded in pdf.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have created malicious VBA
macros and detected malicious word and PDF
documents by analyzing them through tools. We
have analyzed the behaviour of the macro virus
using Noriben tool that acts as an intelligent
wrapper for procmon. Similarly we have detected
the embedded PDF virus by using PDF Stream
Dumper and peepdf tools. We have demonstrated
the  PDF Stream Dumper specialized tools for
dealing with obsfuscated javascript, low level pdf
headers, objects, and shellcode
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